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I{hy a  speclflc  legal  framervorF  of  thg  Connunlev
l'lhen conslderlng  the  conmunlty  as a neans of  developlng  free  trade  between
the  $ix  nember  countries  and with  the.outer  world,  one mlgirr ionder  why a specl- flc  legal  framework should  be requlrerJ.  I,lhether it  U"  to  ser  up an lnternational organizaclon  or  to  promote harmonization and even unification  oi  laru, precedents
have been set,  specialty  -i" rhe European  field.  Irhy shourd rhe l;t;i  ;;;ti;r, arlslng  ln  the  Coununlty  be handled  ln  an unusual  r,ray?
The anewer to  thls  quest,lon is  sinple.  The Menber  States of  che Conmunlty
have chosen to  face  more Ehan a rnere problen  of  trade.  They are  faclng  ttre prou- lems of  peace on the  European continent  and of  survival  in  a trenendous world revolution.
The late  hist,ory,  in  rvhlch Great Brltaln  has played a so toilfur  and prominent rol'e has erophasized  the necessity  of  an er,d.rring reconclllatlon  between
France and Germany  and of  tlght  llnks  between the countrles  of  $lestern contlncntal
Europe and the  [lestern  r,rorld as a whole.  Concernporary  events  1ay the  streas  on
the  urgency -of  a dynauric and coherent  revolutlon  of  tire  old  Euroiean  countri.es
in  the  fleld  of  science  and of  economy.  Indeed_,  the  pronoters  oi  the  European
Courunities  have been convinced, ever since  they  started  the Coal and Steei
couununity ten  years. ago,  that,they  had to  pave the  rray for  a new Europe,  in  which
the nations  would face,  united,  the challenges of  their  comslon  future.
On the  other  hand,  the  Menber States  are  determlned  to  secure  the  fu1l
economlc  advantages of  a common  narket,  and, as has been pointed  out,  thls  re-
quiree  the  control  of  such a market  by means of  common  rules  and conmon  lnsti-
tutions.
The slx  nations  that  have agreed to  carry  on the  flrst  steps  towards  these
airns have therefore  concluded more than  a nere  trade  agreenent between thenselves.
They have started  ln  the  field  of  economy  to  forge  an tnsenble  and ro  foster
Jolnt  actlon.
They have made  use of  the classlcal  nethods of  lnternatlonal  organlza-
tLons.  They have qq'-{f,fsd  themselves to  speclfic  obllgatlons  and ttrey have set
uP cornaon  instltutions  co follow  the executlon  of  these obligatlons,  tL  adJust
then  by rnutual consent  lf  it  would prove  necessary,  and to  allow  the  use of
e8cape clauses by a naJorlty  vote.  Ae far  as that-goes,  the European  Courunltles
do not  differ  baslcally  frorn such lnternatlonal  orgintzatlons  as b.a.r.r.  or  the
E.  F.T.  A.
But  the  Menber states  have gone a 6tep  further.  on the  one hand,  they
have agreed to  follow  cbrnqon  pollcles  in  sucir flelds  as agriculture,  conrercial
relatlons  wtth  the outer  world,  and to  a certaln  extent  tronsportation,  coal  and
s9e91r and peoceful  uses of  atontc  energyr  They lrave also  decided  to  coordlnate
thelr  overall  econonls  and soclal  pollcy.  0n the  otlrer  hand,  havlng  latd  down
ln  the  Treotiee  cornrnon  rulss  snd tho  obJoctlveg  of  thq  coE6o; pollcleo,  they
have enpowered the  lngtltuttons  of  the  Counun{ty  to  fuoplenont the  ruloo  ond to
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:arry-  out  thc  obJocttvos.  rhus,  wlchln  spoclf locl lirnlr.:e, cho Mombor  stoteE
nave Eronstorred  to  thoso InBtltutlons  o potrar to nake declalons,  whlclr rnoy,
whon  so otlpulated  by the Treatlcs,  be dlroctly  blndlng  in  the l.tenbor  Stotes
llkc  the natlonal  lav.
These lnnovatlons  glvo  to  the Buropeon  Conmuntty  -  lncludlng  ln  this
appollatlon  the  three  couununttles  of  the 
-common 
Narket,  coal  and sleel,  and
Euratoxn  -  lts  epeclfic  features.  The 1ega1  syste& of  ine  Courunlty  ts  bascd
on a speclfic  cornblnatlon of  comnon  rules  and of  coumon  institutlons  rqhich
lntfoduces  a change ln  the  trBditlonol  methods  of  lnternatlonal.  partnerehlp.
CgmU-rltty  and  Federatlon
The  transfer  of  powers  to  coaimon  lnstttutions  whlch  are  entltled  to  lay
down corunon  rules  directly  blnding  in  all  the  Member states,  unusual  in  the
classlcal  Lnternat.lonal  organizatLons,  have  suggested  the  viev  that  the  European
Comtunity  is  a  federal  or  quasi-federal  State.  Even  chough the  Comrounity does
nake  use  of  some federal  Eeehniques,  thls  vieru  is  rnuch too  systematlc  ani  could
be really  quite  misleadlng.
_  a)  First.,  lt  should  be  observed  that  the  flelcl  of  competence of  the
European  Comnunity  ls  strictly  lirnited  to  economy.  The hard  tore  of  pollcical
povrer remains  exclusively  vested  in  the  six  natlons,  and  1s not  transferred
to  the  Comrunityr  contrary  to  rvhat  happens  in  a  federal  State.  Tl.re }lenber
states  have  noc  given  away any  of  their  rlghts  of  sovereignty  as  regards  for
instance  foreign  policy  (except  for  conneriial  matters)  d;fe;se,  poli"e,
finance.  Everyone  remembers  the  drama[ic  failure  of  the  projeciei  Euroiean
Defense  Conrnunity  (EDC) before  the  French  Parliament  in  1-954;  The  Memblr  sraEes,
remaining  fully  soverelgn  ln  the  po1ltical  field,  have  transferred  lirnited
powers  only  in  the  fleld  of  economy,  in  order  to  achleve  speclfied  obJectlves
ttrlth  rsell-defined  means.
This  baslc  fact,  whlch  bears  far-reaching  consequences,  precludes  the
exlstence  of  a  federatlon.  In  almos!  all  malters  truly  declsive  for  the  fate
of  a  nation,  decisions  are  made by  each  llember  state  and  not  by  che  conmon
institutions.  It  ls  Just  the  opposite  of  rqhat happens  in  federal  States,  such
as  the  U.S.A.  or  Sruitzerland.
b)  secondly,  even  in  the  field  of  economy  to  ruhich  the  corununity  ls
llmltedr  t'here  is  no  rigld,  systematic  f,ransfer  of  por.rers to  the  conmon inscl-
tut,ions.  The Treaties  do not  assign  economy as  a whole,  nor  even  parts  of  it,
to  the  coulPetence  of  the  common institutlons.  They  proceed  with  a  rernarkable
flexiblllty.  In  each matter  upon which  agreenent  to  cornmon  obJectives  or  com-
non  rules  has  been reached,  the  Mernber  States  have  decided  ln  detall  to  rrhae
extent,  if  any,  and  under  which  condltlons  the  connon  instltutions  rsould  be
comPetent  to  make declsions.  Contrary  to  trhat  rvouLd happen  in  a  federal  systern,
the  lnstltuElong  of  the  Conurunlty  have  no  general  comperence  to  take  whatever
measures would  prove  necessary  t.o reach  the  asslgned  obJectives  in  the  fleld
of  economy.  They  can  only  act  rvithin  the  speclflc  llmlts  set  by  the  Treatles
for  the  matter  concerned.
-  -  c)  Thlrdlyr  the  constltutlonal  frarne of  the  CornnunLty is  far  fron  that
of  a  federal  government.  Llmit,ed  porfers  have  been  transferrld  to  the  four
lnstltutions  of  the  Counounityr  A Councll,  ln  whlch  each Member State  ls  repre-
sented  by  a member of  lts  Government,  and  an  executtve  body  -  called  the  High
Authorl'ty  in  the  Coql  and  Steel  Conmunlty  and  the  Conuolsston  in  the  Coumon
ltarket  and  ln  Euratom  -  slrare  the  porver  to  lay  dorsn conmon rules,  to  urake up
execuclve  dectsione  and-to  ensure  appllcation  of  the  obllgatlons  set  up  Uy the
Treatteg.  A  stngle  Parltanentsry  Asserobly,  conposed  of  nerubers of  the  nottonal
Parltqnents  dtscueses  publicly  all  motters  falllng  wlthln  the  flold  of  courpe-
tence of  the tlrree Connunitles, is  conoulted on the connon  pollcles  and on the
proJoctad  coEnon  rules ond  oxerclso8  parltonsnt8ry control upon  the threo.3-
oxocutlvo  bodloe  tlhlch  lt  can dlenlss  by  a  tr,ro-thlrds  maJorlty  vote.  In  ordor
to  en$ure  observance  of  law  ln  the  lnuorprotatlon  and appltcatton  of  the  tttrae
Troatles,  o slngle  Court  of  Justlce,  composed  of  sevon Juages and trrro  advocaces-
general,  ls  enpotrcred nalnly  to  g{vo  flnal  sentonces  on ont  allcged  vlolatlon  of,
tlto  ltttv of  the  ConrnurrLty,  to  revlew,  and co annul  {f  rhey  Lre  tllegal,  the  sccs
of  the  Council  and of  the  executive  bodles,  and to  decldi  on the  non-contractual
Itabtltty  of  tho  coununlries  for  any dotnages  cauoed by  them.
A pecul{ar  stress  ls  generally  la1d  on  the  originallty  of  these  four
lnetltutlons,  qulte  unueual  {n  internat,lonal  organlzatlo[so  But,  ln  spite  of,
superficial  efintlarities  wlth  the  Bxecutlve,  the  Senafe,  the  Hause and the
Supreme  Court  of  q Federatton,  the  four  sormon Institutions  shouLd not  hide
the  fact  that  ln  the  Cornnunlty  the  declstve  lnfluence  remains  wlth  the  Menber
States.
Indeed,  on  the  one  hand,  all  rnembers of  the  Connnon  Instltutions  are
appolnted  by  the  Member Statee.  The rnenbers of  the  executive  bodles  and of
the  Court  of  Juscice  are  nominated  by  unanlnous  consent  of  the  six  Governmenrs
for  a  period  of  four  or  six  years.  The members of  the  Parliarnentary  Assernbly
are  elected  by  each  national  Farliasrent  among thelr  or,n roembers, attd there  ls
no  sign  as  yet  that.  the  proposal  nrade by  che  Parliarnentary  Assenbly  itself  ln
accordance  rvlth  the  Treaties  for  the  dlrecc  election  of  ils  urernberi by  the
people  of  the  I'lember  states  shall  be accepted  by  the  six  Governnents.
On the  oEher  hand,  the  Treatles  require,  for  laying  dor,n corqmon  rules
or  for  rnaking  decislons  that  affect  notably  the  esonomlc  pollcles  of  the  I'leurber
statesr  the  particlpatlon  of  the  Councll,  conposed of  the  natlonal  gorrerntrents
who are  responsible  only  to  their  national  ParllamenEs.  Thus,  the  exercise  of
the  transferred  pollcy-naklng,  rule-rraking  and Treaty  revier,ring  powers  is  sub-
Ject  to  close  discussLon  by,  and in  most  cases  consent  of,  the  Member  States.
A  strlking  exanple  of  che  final  porvers of  the  national  governments  qras glven
last  year  ln  the  coal  crlsls  when the  system of  productlon  quotas  proposed  by
the  lligh  Authorlty  failed  to  meet  the  agreement  of  the  Councll  requlred  by  rhe
Treaty  for  its  ftoplementation.
Though the  Treatles  have not, shared  the  respectlve  coupetences  of  the
executive  bodies  and of  the  councll  by  reference  to  a general  rule  but  by
specifie  provlslons  for  each matter  concerned,  it  can be  said  that  the  execu-
tive  bodies  can act  wlthout  parElclpatlon  of  the  Councll  only  ln  matters  of
a  truly  executlve  character.  When  act,lng  alone,  they  are  nainly  entttled  to
control  the  executlon  of  the  law  of  the  Corvrmunlty, to  take  actlon  against  lts
violation  by Mernber  States  or  by  individuals  and enterprlses,  to  ma[e declsions
in  tndlvidual  cases,  otr to  allow  Menber  States  to  apply  temporary  and  lislited
escape clauses.  lltthin  the  lirnits  set  by  the  Treatles  or  by  the  Counclt  rhey
can  also  issue  regulations  lmplenenting  the  cormon  rules.  Foltowing  the
dLrectlves  of  the  Councll  and subJect  to  its  eontrol,  they  nay nego-iate  r,rith
thlrd  countrles  on  the  behalf  of  the  Conmunity.
These exaroples conflrn  that  all  decLsions  affectlng  corrnon pollcles  or
laying  doqrn cornnon rules  are  a uatEer  for  the  coupetence  of  the  Counclt.  But
chey  also  point  out  how federal  technlques  have  been  used  to  en6ure,  by  means
of  an  lndependent  body  actlng  for  the  Cournunlty  as  a wholel  an  cbJective  execu-
tion  of  the  Treatles.
Certalnlyr  the  Conslunity  ls  not  Just  an ordinary  lnternational  organiza-
tion,  merely  subJect  to  the  usual  rules  of  lnternatlonal  tatr.  llowever,  on
accounc  of  the  linits  asslgned  to  the  transfer  of  powers  and of  the  predourl-
nance  of  the  Member States,  the  Courounlty,  as  yet  and rshatever  lts  potentiali-
ttes  may be,  cannot  be  assimllated  to  the  rlgtd  system of  a real  federationo-4-
-  Upon closer  exarnlnot,lon, uhe spcciflc  cornblnotlon  of  conmon  rulcs  and of  common  lnstituttons  adoptccl vltlrln  the  cormunlty,  evcn though it  lmplie.s
a  llmlted  transfer  of  the  power of  the  $tcmber  scacl",  appeors to  oirn prlnmrtly
at  orgonizlng  and strengthenlng  the  coopcratlon  of  ihese  statoe  to$rards tlre occonpllshnent  of  the  agroed objectlves.
I.  The flrst  obJecttve  of  the  lnstltutlolat  svstom q-f.the:4.Ennlunitv is  to
enable the }lember  states  to  acquir-a  vlerJ-of-rh  f"ter"st  as a whole, and to  urge  tlrem to  take  actlon  in  cooperatLon.  In  most internatlonal  organl-
?atLons,  and that  goes also  for  the coincil  of  Europe, negotlatlons  betrseen
natlonal  governnents-End  ln  a cornpromlse  on the  basis'of  a glve  and take  bar- galnr  or  ln  a laclc of  compromlse  ensurlng  cooperatlon  throu[h  inaction.  Thls
result  should  ralse  no crltictsm  as regaids  lnternarlonal  oiganlzarions  that have no other  alm than  provlding-a  forum for  negotiations.  But  it  rrrould  iurpede the  progresslon  tottards  a "soluiion  dfensenble'r-which  is  the  specific  ob3ective
of  the  connunicy.  To avoid  this  danger,  tlre  institutional  systeur of  the'Com-
nunlty  provldes  for  three  remedies.
a)  0n the  one hand,  all  the  decisions  are  prepared  by the  executive  body of  the  cornnrunlty  concerned,  This  body has primariiy  lne  mission  to  elaborace
proposals  anstrrering the  obJectives  and r.quir"r.r,ts  of  tlle  Treatles  and ensur- lng  the  conmon  interest  of  che Coumunity.  The executlve  body is  noc meant eo proceed  to  .a Prepatatory  negotiation  berryeen  representatives  of  the  l,leurber states,  as any committee of  the  council  could  do.  rt.  is  required  to  reach, and to  state  in  all  foLlowing  dlscusslons  rvith  the  Council  or  the  Asseurbly,
an independent but  responsible  vierv on each matter  concerned,  from  Ehe stand- point  of  the  Cornrnunlty  as a ruhole.  Its  proposals  are  submllted  to  the  Council.
The executive  body participates  with  the  representaEives  of  the  l,fernber  staces
in  all  the  discussions  held  in  the  council.  Thus,  from  the  sEart  as r.rell as
during  the  debates  tn  r'rhich each government defen<ls, as they  should,  their
nationat  interest,  a volce  spealcs  for  the  tnterest  of  tn"  clnurunity  as  a
rshole.
b)  on  the  other  hand,  the  Council,  after  a  thorough  discusston  of  the
proposals  subrnltted  by  the  executlve  body,  is  urged  ro  take  a step  torrrards
action.  To that  effecE,  decisions  in  the conmunlty  can be rnade, as a rule,
trtiEh a rnaJoriEy vote  of  the  council.  There  are  of  course  exceptions.  The
Treatles  provide  that  ln  some  cases which  have appeared to  sornl Member  states
of  paramount importance  or  in  ttrhich actlon  should  be Eaken to  reach  the  obJec-
tives  of  the  conmunity without  having  been foreseen  in  Ehe Treatles,  the  unani-
mous consent  of  the  Council  is  necessary.  But  the  principle  is  that  most de-
clslons  can be carried  on when there  is  a naJority  tn  the- Council  to  support
the  proposals  of  the  executive  body.
_  Thls  principle  is  worked out  ln  a dlfferent  way ln  the  coal  and
Steel  Cor,muntty on  the  one hand,  and  in  the  Connon Dtarlcet and Euratom  on  the
other  hand.  In  Ehe Coal  and Steel  Cowmunity, detailecl  rules  and rnaln lines  of
the.cornmon  pollcy  have been defined  ln  the  tieaty  itself,  leaving  ro  the  Insti-
tutions  to  decide  only  on their  lmpleneneaclon and chelr  appltcaiion  in  lndivi-
dual  cases.  The decisions  are rnade  by  the  High Authorlty,  ittth  the  previous
consulcatlon,  and uraJorlty  consent  ln  matters  of  sone ftnportance,  of  the  Council.
In  Euratomr  and stl1l  ttrore so  ln  the  Cornnon  Market,  the Treaties  have often  set
rnerely  the  obJeccives  and prlneiples,  leaving  to  the  Instltutions  to  decide  on
conmon  policles  and connon rules.  The declsions  are  then made by  the  Councll
ltself  on the  propcsal  of  the  Conmisslon.  The Councll  may adopr  the  proposal
of  the  comlssion  by a rnaJorlty  vote;  but  it,  nay  also  adopr ly  unanlroous  con-
sent  a declslon  wlth  r,rhlch the  conmlssion  dlsagries.  one more precaution  has
been taken;  naJority  rule  only  appltes  during  the  flrst  years  to  matters  of
mlnor  lmportance,  unaniml.ty belng  'still  required  during  Lhose years  for  all
the  maln  decis{ons  laytng  doln  the  fundauental  comnon rules  or  ieflntng  the
basts  of  conmon  pollctes,
-  In  adopctng these  dlfferenE  rules  of  vote,  rhe  slx  liember Stotes
have shotm the  flexlbtltty  of  thelr  nethods  and the  perrnonence  of  thair  one
ofuil: to fo8tsr Bctlve cooperatlon  betr{eon  thomselves.  The  }lenbor  Stotes,-5.
not  botng  ablo  to  Btop actron  by a noro veto,  aro  urgod  to  ogroo on d con- certcd  soluttorr.,  As iroped forr-trrc  rnaJorlty  rure  apirtod  in  the  counclr  to the  proposals  of  the  cxtcuttve'boJy  woike  o!  an rn"eitruo  for  una.lmous and actlvq  cooperatlon.
contrary  to  the  rule  applled  ln  sorno  internattonal  organlzatlons folloulng  ruhlch a irember state  cai'prevent  appricatlon,  os  far  as  rt  rs  con- cerned,  of  decrslons  to  ruhich lt  has not  agreid,  the  maJorlty  rure  safeguarcrs unlty  ln  the  conrmunlty.  coumon  declslons  il"y-rri  tor,"nr-and  iomnon o"ctor, o'oy be carrted  out  througirout  the  connunr.ty desplte  the  opposltion  of  a lrember state  in  the vore.  Experience  has shoim ril;-;u;i,-"iro,  "on  happen in  rhe three  connunLttes.--  This  ernphasizes the  fact  that  the  council  is  not  only  a conference  of  the-Mernber  states,  but  truly  an rnstlfutlon  of  the  counrunlty. rt  also  suggests  that,  as should  be the  "l.n  in"oni-dorununiry,  a full  under- standing  and respect  for  the  needs and problems oi".ucr,  partner  ls  a condition of  the  developnent.of  the  couruunlty as a whole.  The naJorlty  rule  can only  be safely  irnposed  on the  opposltion  wiren thts  attltude  ls  not  rlkely  to  question the  very  exlstence  of  tirir Coununity  itself.
c)  Last  but  not  leastr  the  parllamentary  Assembly provrdes  'upporE, incentive  and constant  controi  for  the  actlon  .i  ttt"-co|.rncil  and of  the  execu- tive  bodies.  I'lhether through  public  debates  rn  rsrrictr  these  rnstltutlons responsible  for  act{on  participate,  oT through  publlshed  questions  and answers, or  again  rhrough  Ehe work of  lts  comltreesr-rh;  p;;iianenrary  Assernbly  pushes for$rard an active  accourplishment of  the  obJectives  of  the  connunlty.  rts  pres- suret  necessarlly  indirecc  on the  council  iince  the  national  governrnencs  are, as aforesald,  only  responslble  to  their  national  parllarnents,  is  very  effectlve on the  execucive  bodies.  These have Ehe dtfflcult  tasr.  to  keep rhe  confidence  of the  governmentsr r"ho have appointecl then  and ruithout  ihe  collaboraEion  of  which nothing  can be done,  and of- the  Assernbly that  can iort  "upport  and dismiss  them. But  'tithout  that  suPport  and menace, whlch  is  the  essence of  parrtarnentary control,  the  influence  of  the  executive  bodies,  as volces  of  che lnEerest  of the  conmunlty  and promoters  of  joint  action,  r,rould  be severely  cut  dorvn.
rr'  The lnstltutlonal  system of  the  conmunlty has been deslgned to  favor  an iurpu1setorvardsaction.Thu￿seekstoprovidefor
efficlency.
a)  Irllthin  a couElon  market  based on  the  free  movement of  nen  and .nt€r- prtses,  free  florl  of  goods,  capital  and servicu",  .or-orr_r''r1."  are  neces'ary. Freedom  must be safeguarded,  falr  play  must be ensu  ,  legal  Eeans of  action must  be provided  for  tn  a  comparabie  if  not  in  the  sane vay  Hrroughout  the coumon }larket.  As  any  latryer  learns  through  hls  or,n experlcnce,  couucon  rules do not  forge  a coumuntty,  6ut  a courunity  eannot  be  forged  rslthout  conmon rules.
of  course,  as ln  any internatlonal  organizatlon,  the  corf,non  lnstl- tutions  may, by neans of  ophtlns  and reco*"naoiio.rr,  p"a  a non negllgible moral  pressure  on  the  Mernber  states  to  lnduce  them to  harnonlze  or  unlfy  thelr natlonal  larv'  Butr  on certain  natters  at  least,  the  couron ltarket  requlres really  cornnon  rules  known to  all  people  o.ra .rrt..f"i"u"  "on"erned,  and each Menber state  cannot  rernain  free  tL  declde  ruheti-rerl when and horu lts  nattoual law  should  be modlfied.
The usual  uethods  of  lnternatlonar  rarv are  not  quite  proper  to  ray doqtn a  lats of  the  comnunity  ensurlng  throughout  the  conmon }tarket  the  appllca- tlon  of  cornrqon  rules  on che natters  where iu"tr  .ui""-oiouu  to  be necessary.
Tg bn conPletely  unlform,  these  rules  should  be statei  in  Treatlec  or  conven- tlons  submleted to  rattftcatton  ln  the  Menber states,  whlch qeans ln  rnost cases a parltamentary  debaLe.  rt  would be unreall"ti.'to  regulre  thrs  long and polttically  dtfflcult  procedure  to  lay  down, rnodify or  adspe the  couron rules,  speclally  ln  the  uovlng  and corcplei  ttora  of  eclnorry.  on the  other hand,  conmon  rules  should  be unlf,orn  and coutd-""oi"uiy  be so  tf  each llember state  poeses lcs  own legrslation.  Anyhorr, even a untelrn  text  can produce
inportant  dlfferences  lf  lntorpreted  sepaiately  by  the  dlfferent  nuiionui GoUftSr.6-
To ovorcona thoso  lnconvontoncoo,  t,ho Dtcnbcr  Stotoo  ltavo a6rood
to  lay -dotrn  on spocif lod  nattcrs  o law of  ttio  Conrnunlty, df rcctiy  frfiriiiri  nnO
appltod  as national  latu  tulthln  onclr  I'lember  Staco, ana LuUlocc to'"ovorofin
|1]lolnrgtatlon  by the  slngle  court  of  Jusulca of  rhe Couurintry"  As aforisald,
tlre  bosic  lats of  the  Communlty, nrore or  less  dotallccl,  ls  la1<l 4orm ln  tle
TreaEles  themselvos.  But  lt  has to  be conplcted,  pos"tt ly  aclaptecl, anyhorr
funplernentod  and oppliecl  to  in<livldual  case;.  Hrihin  the  iimtts  of'cornietence
and under  the  condlrlons  of  procedure  dctennlnecl by che Treoty  for  eacir nacuer,
the  Councll  and the  executLve bodles  are  enticled  Lo do so.  ihey  are  empowere,l
to  make regulatlons  Ishich bind  everyone tn  the  Comrunity,  sucS ui  o r"guiatlon
tnplement'lng  the  basic  anti-cartel  law  lald  dor,m  in  the  Treaciesl  chey can also
nake indlvldual  deelslons  blnding  only  rhe  addressees,  such as a declsion
recognizing  the  conformlEy  or  the  non-conformtty  rvlth  the  antl-cartel  law of
one speciftc  cartel.  These acts  are  dlrectly  blndlng,  wLthout  any incerventlon,
of  the  Mernber  States.  Their  violatlon  ls  asslmllaEecl Eo a vtolation  of  the
Treatles  themselves.
A strlcLly  uniform  latq ls  not  alrvays required  and possible.  the
Institut'lons  are  also  ernpowered  therefore  to  issue  directLves,  asslgning  a
blnding  objective  to  the  Member  StaEes rrrho  are  free  to  reach  i.t  Uy appr6priate
national  means.  To comply rsich the  directives,  some  l"lember  statel  wiit  ir..r"
to  reform  their  legislaElon,  ot,hers to  rnodify merely  governnental  regulatlons,
others  again  to  issue  completely  netr neasures.  ConErary to  regulations  and
individual  decisions,  the  direccives  are  only  bindlng  on the  Meurber  States
concerned.  They..have an indirect  and imperfect  effect  in  the  Cornmunity  as  far
as they must be "translated'r,  ruith the risk  of  sllgllt  differences,  in  each
national  larv.  But  thls  flexibility  nay ureet befter  practical  problenrs.  The
l'lenber States  anyhorv  have no power to  rejcct  or  modify  the  directives  rqhich
are  binding  on Ehen as  the  Treaties  themselves.
The Treaties  specify  in  some  cases that  the measures concerplaged
by  the  comnton  instit.utions  should  be formulaEecl as regulations,  or  as iecislons,
or  as directlves.  But  in  most cases where the  instltutions  are enporrered Eo
lay  dorvn the  larv of  the  ConrnuniLy, the  CouncLl  and the  executlve  boaies  have  a
free  choiee,  which  they  exercise  rather  pragmatically  taking  into  account
polttical  and technical  clrcumstances.
b)  I^lhether latd  dotvn in  the  Treaties  or  lssued  by  the  coffmon  instltu-
tions,  the  common  rules  could  be rightly  regarded  as the  larl  of  the  Corurunity
only  as  far  as  some  procedure  is  organized  to  ensure  thelr  execr:tion.
1)  The Mernber  States  have agreed in  the  Treaties  on their  duty  co take  all
general  or  Particular  measures appropriate  co carry  ouf  the  obligatlons  arLsing
ouc of  the  TreaEy or  resulcing  from  the  acts  issued  by  ttre conmon  instltuElons.
Butr  each Member  State  cannoE  be  the  final  Juclge  of  its  or,m  obligations
under  the  latr  of  the  Connunity.  The Court  of  Justlce  of  the  Conrounlty has  been
rnade exclusivety  conpetent  tn  thls  matter  ancl any  alleged  lnfringenenl  of  the
obllgaEions  of  a Member  State  under  the  lars of  the  Community  can be referred
to  this  Court, by  the  executlve  bodies  or  by eaeh Member  State.
IE  should  be observed thac,  at  least  in  t,he Conmon  l"larket and in  Euratom,
when a Menber St,ate lntends  to  lnstitute  proceedtngs  before  the  Court  of  the
Conuunlty  against  another,  the  Datter  must flrst  be referred  to  the  Coumission
whlch must glve  a reasoned opinion  wlthin  a perlod  of  three  rnonths.  Thus,  a
dispute  betrveen  }lember  States  rnay  be setEled  by  the  ConrnLsslon  wlthout  it  being
necessary  to  refer  to  the  court.  And tf  it  does go to  the  Court,  the  vl.ews
of  che Conmlsslon,  speaklng  for  t,he conmon  lnterest  of  the  Conrnuntty, wl]l  be
taken  i.nto  account  as welt  as  the views  of  tlre Menber States  lnvolvecl  ln  the /dispute.  Up to  notr, no I'lenber State  llas ever  lnstltuted  such proceedings.
It  should  atso  be observed that  when the  CornnlssLon  considers  that  a
llember  scste  has falled  to  fulftll  one of  its  obligacions,  it  urust flrst
address a reasoned opinlon  to  thls  l'lenber State  and lay  down a reasonable
perlod  to  conply  r.rtth the  terms  of  thlo  oplnton.  This  proceduro  of  a prevlous
reasoned oplnlon,  glven  after.  requlrlng  the  llcmber States  to  submlt  lls  com-
ncnts, hoe  proved  alroady  Buccessful. rt  nay be notlced thot under  tho-?-
Europcan coal  cnd^  stcel  corsnunlty Treaty,  tho  scmc rcgult  ls  ochtsvcd  by  a somowhot  dlfforant,  and loss  frt6nctly,  firocoduro:  tho  lltgh  AutSorlty,  lftor
roquiring  t'ho }tomb€r  stato  to  submlt- ltl  conrnenls, stotos  tn  a docisi6n  thot
thie  lterntror  stato  hqs  failcd  to  fulftll  one of  lts  obligatlons  ancl lays  <lornr
a.perlod  to  comply.  Tlro Member  stares  con then  attack  ihc  <taclslon oi  chu
tllgh  Authority  bofore  the  court  of  the  Gornrnunlty. Thts  procedurs  aleo  has proved  srtccossful,  at  leost  for  provldlng  the  Ciluru ryltlr  cases ond the  lawyers
wdth extra  workl
If  the  Court  of  Justiqe  finds  that  a }lenber State  has  indeed failed  to
fulftll  any of  tts  obllgatlons  under  the  lars of  the  Comnunlty,  the  State  nust
take  the  measures required  for  lmplenentatlon  of  the  Judgroeni-of the  Courg.
But  t'he Connunlty  has  no rneans of  enforcenent  against  a l,lenber state.  In  some
casesr  retortlon  neasures rnay  be taken  by  the  couirnon.  lnstltut,ions  or  rsith  their
authorlzatlon  by  the  other  Menber SEates,  to  corresc  the  consequences  of  Ehe
fallure.  A systcmatlc  provlslon  of  Ehis  lclnd,  somewhat  theoretical,  exists  ln
the  European CoaI  and Steel  Treaty,  but  has  not  been reproduced  ln  ihe  Roure
Treatles.  In  reality,  falllng  to  cornply with  a decision  of  the  Court  staEing
Its  obllgattons  under- Ehe Treaty  is  higirly  inprobable  on the  part  of  a Menber
state.  A fallure  would mean that  the  }lenber state  is  questlo;ing  tfre "aiCectlo
societatlstt  ruLthouc  whlch  the  Cornurunlty  cannot  1lve',  and rvould therefore  ralse
a baslc  poliEical  probleur.  I'Ihen  drafting  the  Rorne  ireacles,  the  Menber States
have considered  that  such a  sltuation  should  be handled bef,\,reen  them on a
politlcal  and not  on a legal  basls.
2)  Execution  of  the  larq of  the  community by  lndividuals  and enterprises
withtn  Ehe Coununity  does not  raise  the  same  piobleurs.
If  indtvlduals  or  enterprises  fall  co courply with  their  obligatlons  under
the  larv of  the  Communlty, penalties  rnay be  tuposla-upon  them.  the  iame  infringe-
mencs should  cause-the  sane penalties  throughbut  ehe Connounity.  But  penal  1aw remains  a rnatter  of  exclustve  competence  of  the  ltenber states  and is  oppiiua
in  each State  by  the  natlonal  courts.  Tlre European Coal and Steel  counrunicy
lreaty-has  therefore  enpowered the  High Authority  co apply  pecuniary  sagctions or  daily  penalry  payments wlthin  LimlEs  set  up  rir ttre i;oirty.  The lerson  or
enterPrlse  concerned must be previously  requlred  to  submlt  its  conmlnts.  The
declsions  imposing penaltles,nay  be referred  ro  the  general  Jurisdtction  of  the court,  thus  entltled  to  annul  che declsion  or  nodlfy  the  perritty.  special
penalties  have been provided  for  1n Buraton  Treacy.  The Europein Eclnonic  com-
munlty  Treaty  does not  itself  instiLute  penalties,  but  whenevlr  Justifled  these
are  stipulated  ln  the  regulatlons  issued  by  the  comon  institutlons.
-  A special  system of  enforceuent  of  pecunlary  obllgatlons  is  provlded
for.  It  applles  to  enforcement  of  the  above-nentlonect penalcies,  but  also  co
enforcement  of  the  dectslons  of  the  Court.  The Couunlcy  has no neans of  lEs
9wn f9r  enforcing  such dectsions.  The Treatles  have theiefore  stipulated  that,
forced  execuElon  shalt  be  autoroatlcally  ensure<I by  the  l,lernber  Statls.  The rrrlt
of  executlon  shall  _be served  by  the  l"leuber States  without  other  fornal.ity  than
the  verlflcatlon  of  the  authentlclty  of  the  decislon  tssued by  the  "oo*oi
instLtutlons.  No prevlous  review  of  this  decision  can be madl by any authority
of  the  }tember  States.  Thls  epecial  system has proved  successf,ul on several
occasLons 1n Coal and Steel  matfers.
Far  frosr establlshlng  a rlgld  code of  rights  ancl  obligatl_ons,  the
Menber Scates have transferred  to  connon lnstttutlons  subJecf  to  thetr  pre-
domtnant  lnfluence-polters  and legat  neon6 nccessary  to  carry  out  the  acirteve-
trent  of  the  obJectlves  and prlnciplee  of  the  connuntty.  t,tlrile accoropllshlng
thelr  mlssLon,  thc  lnetltut{ons,  though bound by  tlre rnore or  lcss  detalled
prov{etons  of  the Trcatloe,  have a  large  onount of  froedon  ln  solectlng  tho
conmon pollclee  or  detornlnlng  tlre  larr  of  thc  Connunlty.
orces. and lnst-B-
l'lhon chosln8  ihorr  rray,  thoy  rravq to  face  and to  rr,eigh  Erre  varrous and ofton  confllctlng  tnteresis  chau co-oxlsu  withlrr  cho t'tcibcr sratas.  r.ne dtfferonccs  beltueen  tho ocouomlc  and soclal  structuros  of  the  mcmbor  qountricg
tncroasos  tho  trumber  and reltrforccs  the  luport.ance of  cho basic  opposltlons
tvhtch havo to  be setLled.  l{lthtn  the Oommunlty  co-exisr  blgger  ani'snaller countrtes,  different  degrces and means  of  governmental contiol  on the national econonies,  tradluionally  lorv tarlff  and hi[h  tarlff  counLrles,  economlc  anct soclal  otructuresr  nore  or  lesg  influoncecl by agrlculture  or  industry,  and so on.  A batance must be establlshed  becrrreen  confltccing  forces  and interests.
In  relatlon  wlth  thls  fact,  iE  ls  often  salcl that  the negotlatlons
lnitiated  with  the draftlng  of  the Treaties  continue.  It  should then be uncler- lined  that  these  negotlations  initiated  betrveen the  slx  Meruber  scates  wiflr  the usual procedure and conditions  of  classlcal  international  negoria[lons  continue in  the  different  framerrrork  of  the  Coununlty.  The differences  increases  as a nutual  adJustrnent of  the  conflicting  forcei  and of  the  frarnework of  the  Com- munity  ls  taking  place,  urainly  in  the  Comton  l{arker.
a)  Or the  one handr economic,  soclal  and polltlcal  forces,  traditlonally organized  on a natlonal  scale  are  organizing  rrrithin  the  franerqork of  the  comnunicy.
They have been encouraged ro  do so by  the  lnstitutions  and organs created  by  Ehe TreatLes.  rndeed,  the  parlian"ni"ry  Asseurbly  groups  eog"ihu,
nenbers  of  the  political  parties  of  each llember state.  permanent consultacive
commictees, cornposed  of  representatives  of  the professions,  of  the  trade-uni.ons
and of  the  consumers appoinEed by  the  council,  Lre  see up  uo advlse  the  council
and the  executive  bodies  on lhe  economic and social  aspects  of  Lheir  decisions.
Previous  consuLtatton  of  these  corunlttees  is  either  reluired  by  the  Treaties,
or  freely  asked for,  whenever helpful,  by  the  Councll  or  the  executive  bodies.
These official  meetings,  as well  as spontaneous  initiaEives,  have
promot'ed  regular  meetlngs,  if  not  permanent offttes,  by means of  r,rhich  profes-
sional  interests  or  politicaL  attieudes  in  the  Coumon  ilarket  are  studled  r,rich
a vieru of  deflntng  concerted action.  The evolution  has a double resulc.  First,
when put  to  the  national  governments,  the vlews  of  natlonal  organlzattons  are
already  influenced  by  their  prevlous  studies  in  comrnon  trlEh the  similar  organi-
zattons  of  the  other  member  countries.  Secondly,  vhen these  studtes  have en-
abled  to  reach  connon vlews,  these  are  not  only  given  to  the  national  governments
but  also  to  the  executive  bodies  and to  the  Parlianentary  Asseurbly, which  con-
stitute  a ne$t  way of  influencing  Ehe flnal  decisions.  The eagernlis  of  pro-
fessional,  trade-untonist  and political  groups  to  keep up rrrith the  Conrniiston
the  same  relations  as with  the  national  goveinmenes il  hlghly  signlflcanE  of
that  evolut,ion.
b)  on the  other  hand,  the  constltutional  custorn graclual.ly developing
in  the  Conmunity ls  adjusting  the  framerrrork  set  by  the  Treatles  co the  evoluEion
of  the  economlc and polltlcal  forces,
Stiroulated  !V  ttre qutckenlng  ttEuropeisatlon'r  of  these  forces,  t,he
Member  scates  are  bound to  retnforce  their  r"in"  of  cooperatlon  ln  the  iouncll.
Monchly neetlngs  of  the  Foreign  Affaires  Mlnlsters,  prepared  by a Commlttee of
Pernanent Representatives  of  the  Member  States,  though they  renrain the  center
of _the activity  of  the  Council  of  the  European E"onoii.  Cournunlty, are  no nore
sufficient  co dectde  on the  proposals  of  che Comrisslon.  Sutrconnittees  of
expert's  are  continuously  neeElng on Lhe dlfferent  nat,ters  involved,  bringlng  ln
dlrecc  contact  the  national  administrations  concerne<I.  Moreover,  whethei  at
the  official  sessionr  of  che Council  or  durlng  preparatory  neetingsl  the  tech-
nlcal  }linlsters  of  the  slx  counlries  neet  regulirly  to  sc;dy  theii  own particu-
Iar  problems of  finance,  agriculture,  transportation,  labor  and so op.  Oling
to  Ehls  grolring  lnterpenetration  ln  everyday  rvorlc, tn  wlriclr  the  Corsnlsslon
always PartlciPates,  sess{ons  of  the  Councli  resemble more to  a large  t'cercle
de  farnille"  chan to  an ordinary  diplomatlc  meetlng.  It  proves very  helpful
when nuf,ual  concesslons  musL be made, for  eltlrer  polttlc;l  or  legai  "ooior,",
to  reach  unanlmous agreetrent,, often  wtth  the  actlve  contrlbutlon  of  the  Corn-
mission.  It  also  provldes  an lndispensable  psychologlcal  supporr  for  the  gxGE-
clse  by  [he  Council  of  lcs  responslblllty  as an Instltutton  oi  rhe Conrnunlty
09 a wlroler.9-
l'lhoroas tlto  Councll  ofton  f,o1lorre, somor,rhat  broothlossly  eomotlmoa,
the  oconomlc forcos  aE tuork in  tho  0onorunityi  ttro Parifomoneouy Asiornbly hae
allays  bcen ahead  -of  the  polltlcal  forcos  fariorfng  uurop"an  lni:agrotton'.  Buu,
slncc  tlto Coal and Steol  Comrnunlty,  lt  starced  to  preparo for  t5e rola  of  a fully  emporsered  Buropeon parliameni.  Flrst,  thougir rlpreoentatlves  of, tire people  of  the nenbor  countries,  the  rnenbers-of th6  parilanenro"y  rt""uruiy  trave qutckly-seL  up thtee  politlcal  groups conprlslng  rulthout any dticrtmlnation  the
natlonals  of  the  elx  countrtes  who itrare  Lhe saie  policlcal  vlewe.  In  each de-
bate,  the denochrlstlan,  soclallst  and ltberal  g"oupr state  the posltion  of
their-  grouP as a t,rhole.  Secondly,  standlng  "o*itctles  and ad-hot  6ubco61tcrees
have been set  uP to  study  che vaiious  matters  oncl  prepare  the  plenary  sessions.
Thus organized,  the  Parllanentary  Assenbly  srruggll"  io  incroduce  tht  largest
anount of  parllanrentary  control  on tlre executtve-bodies:  conrlnuous  questlons
of  the  lndlvldual  mernbers  or  of  the  cor,rnittees,  regular  hearlngs  by  the  comrnit-
tees  and offictal  statements  before  the  plenary  Assenbly,  p"uvlou"-consulta-
tions  of  the  Assernbly on the  proJected  regulations  or  direttives  of  some  slg-
nlficance,  obllge  the  execut,lve bodies  to  Justlfy  thelr  action  or  inaction  and
enables  Ehe Parllamentary  Assenbly  to  part{clpate  in  che deflnltlon  of  the  rnain
llnes  of  the  pollcy  of  these  boclils.  Fu11y consclous  of  the  declslve-power  of
the  natlonal  governmenEs, the  Parllanentary  AssernbLy  nultlplles  lts  tlntatives
to  develop  regular  relatlons  with  the  counttl  which,  as aforesald,  r.s not
responslble  to  that  Assembly.  In  a spirlt  of  mutuai  consideratlon,  some  sceps
have been made towards cooperat,ion betrueen  che c$ro  Inscitutlons.  I{ithin  agreed
Litnits,  the  Councll  ansrvers questions  put, to  it  by  the  Assenbly,  is  represented
by  one of  its  members  ln  most sesslons,  and partlclpates  once a year  to  a speclal
session  devoted  co a mutual  exchange of  vierus on agreed matters.  Desplte  these
achlevements,  the  Parllamentary  Assembly suffers  to  be deprived  of  any poger  of
decLsion  in  the  polltical,  legislative  or  budgetary  fleld,  and is  anxious  thac
nelt stePs would brlng  a remedy to  this  situatlon.  Such as  lt  ls,  Che parlia-
nentary  Assembly provides  a broad  forun  for  publlc  dlscussion  and a dynamic
supPort. for  action.
The role  of  the  executive  bodles,  whtch are  a truly  original  crea-
tlon  of  the  couurunlty,  ls  graduarly  shaping.  Like  lndependent explrts,  each
nenber  of  the  executive  bodies  ls  appointea  Uy unanirnous consent  of  the  1lember
states  and can be bound by no directlves  fron  any Dleurber  States  or  organlzation.
But,  unlike  experts,  they  are  appointed  to  a  fuli-tlne  Job,  they  nust  glve  up
all  other  professlonal  actlvitles  and they  share  tn  the-diiect  iespon"IUfffty
of  their  executive  body as a rshole co the  parllamentary  Assenbly.  rn  the
executive  bodies  meet constantly  and sit  together  at  llasc  once a week,  for  a
term  of  serreral yearsr  natlonals  of  the  difierenc  Menber States,  fororerly
members  of  governnents  or  politicians,  senior  officials  or  diplomats,  business-
men  and trade-unionistsr  professors  in  economlcs, or..r  of.L,rtse  lawyere.
In  these  new rnelting  Pots,  the  members  of  the  execucive  bodtes,  turned  totcards
the  same obJectives  designed  ln  the  Treatles,  bound by  the  same fate  when fac-
ing  the  councll,  the  Assenbly  or  public  oplnion  at  laige,  struggle  alongside
for  the  achievemenc  of  the  European Coulaunlty.  Though entit,led  Eo nake  thelr
declslons  by a uraJorlty  vote,  they  alrvay" ""Lk,  and lenerally  reach by progres-
sive  adJustments  of  their  initial  views,  unanirnous consenE on basic  rnatiers  1n
wh{ch  t'hey  feel  that  the  future  of  the  Conorunlty  is  deeply  lnvolved.  Tireir
frequent  personal  contacts  wlth  srerobers  of  the  natlonal  governnents  and
accredlted  rePresentatlves  of  foreign  governnents,  with  members  and pol!.tlcal
groups  of  the  Parliarnentary  Assembly,  as  well  as wj.th  buslnessmen,  tiade-
untonlsts  and experts,  provides  them with  the  necessary poltt,ical  lnformation.
Their  iEBPortant staff,  comprlslng  also  naEionals  of  the  differenc  l.leuber States
and experts  ln  the  varlous  flelds  covered  by  che Coumunity,  takes  care  of  the
technlcal  and preparatory  work,  ln  constant  consultatlon  with  the  natlonal  and
international  experts.
Thus,  tndependent but  responsl.ble,  composlte  buE unlted,  both  well-
lnforned  and well-equlpped,  thc  executrve  bodies  provlde  a powerfui  help  to
flnd  out  and  to  put  forward  to  the  I'lernbers states  the  {nterest  of  the  Clrnrounlty
as well  ns  to  enaure  an ftnpartial  appllcatlon  of  the  law of  the  Cormunlty  ogrold
upon by  the  llember stotes.  Though they  seldorn possess a truly  doclslve  iogor, thelr  central  and obJecttve  poslt,lon  gives  theu  a grea[  audlenco as well  ln  the
other  lnstltutlons  of  the  Corsruntty ae onong the  f6rces  and interests  at  work
tn  tho  Conmunlty,  ond oxposos thcm to  a largo  onount of  stlnulotlng  crttlclsur-  l0-
Ths court  of  Justlco,  ontltlod  to  chaclc  tho cornpatlblllty  wlth  tho Trcatlos  of  rhc acrron  ror,on-rr!'riio ltort  or  sc;l;;'o;"rry  uro rnerirurlons  of tlte cotnmunity, ls-a  potvcrful safeguard oguin.t-rirJ.""or  aut6ority  or  ctcvlatlons. rn  tlre balances  of. tire  cou.t  i"-"Eierr"a  ir,"  u""y-rriiin"n  of  porvers of  [1o  com- nunlty'  You trill  have tlto prrviicgl-of  hearlng"orroJi''tnrs  frorn rhc prcsi<tonr or  tho courr  hirnselr.  r  tooliJ-Ju.i'rLn;;  ffic;;;-io  ctre  aurrrorrry of  rhe court,  t'rltcther  of  its  "i"uoJt-,riJorour  declstons  ";;i  rrs  nere ehado, ruhlch is  ahvays present  in  trre aorirroi"tions  of  rhe executive  bodles.
Conclusion
rn  thls  rather  loose  frarnelorlc ol  tl't:-cornntrnity continental  Europeans have managed  a surprisingl.y  ro"go'ioo"  for  flexibiltty  and free  choice.  The European  coEmunity offeri  "  nuin-"onrrtnation  of  rules,  of  instltutlons  and of torces  tuhiclt aay pave the  ltay tor'rards an as yet  unusual  kind  of  economic tnter- naLi.onal democracy.
rts  nethods may have to  be adapted co other  fields  chan economy  in  rqhich an organized  and active  cooPeration  betrseen  the  l,tember  srates  ttrould  be under- talcen'  But  they  have at  least  nade clear.ar.oa  in-.if  errectrve  step  Eoruards European unity  it  should  tr"  ruq,rirud  and it  :." po""i,rrfn  a"  associat.e tire Mernber States  and responsible  InsEitutions  act,ing  for  ihe  Corununity as a ryhole.  In the  balance of  forces  and intet""a",  an organized representatron  of  the Burol:ean forces  should  be ensured as rve1l as  Eirat of  natio.al  incerests.
The mosE  por'rerful help  and the  best  safeguard  tn  t6at  direction  should derive  from  the  rradirion  rvhic'rs  sioruty,  pragiaricaiiy  a"vetoping  r,rirhin  rrre Comrnunity, in  a  spirlt  of  groving  ,rrriay.